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Abstract: Drawing on empirical data and property theory, this article explores 
the property structure of a “free school” and the work property 
performs there. At Summerhill, we can see a tension between two 
property registers. On the one hand, the founder and present 
members stress the importance of individual ownership; at the same 
time the school’s property ownership regime involves property-
limitation rules, a dispersal of right, collective forms of property, and 
cross-cutting, pluralized sites of institutional recognition. In exploring 
how this tension is manifested through property’s work, the article 
focuses on property’s contribution to a variegated social life at the 
school, analyzed in terms of personal, civic and boundary relations. 
With belonging treated as the central component of property  rather 
than exclusion or control, ways of understanding what constitutes 
property and how it works shifts.   
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I . . . have day dreamed of a school where every child could have a 
private and public life. (Neill 1948, 33) 
 
Failure and disappointment are recurrent narratives within the Utopian, 
commune, and community literature when property and money are discussed. 
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Communities that start with high ideals—where belongings, income, land, 
and homes (sometimes even bodies) are shared and jointly owned—find 
themselves struggling with the challenges an absence of private ownership 
generates (Cosgel, Murray, and Miceli 1997; Kuhlmann 2000, 162–65; Metcalf 
1995). Then it is told problems and difficulties set in. Members become lazy 
and fail to contribute their share absent personal benefit; they hoard the 
products of their labor; they treat collective goods with disregard, and things 
become damaged or lost. Finally, fierce and frequent conflicts ensue as oncefriends 
compete over what fairness in the use and control of spaces and things 
should mean. 
 
This narrative of anxiety, demoralization, and loss sits behind the story 
of property told in this article. For this is a story of a stable, if evolving, property 
regime, combining elements of both private and more communal systems. 
It concerns Summerhill School, established by the influential educationalist 
A. S. Neill in the early 1920s, and which is still flourishing at the turn of the 
twenty-first century as a predominantly residential, fee-paying school, located 
on the outskirts of a small Suffolk town (Appleton 2003; Croall 1983; Gribble 
1998; Neill 1937, 1968a, 1968b).1 With between eighty and ninety children 
usually attending at any one time,2 many from overseas, Summerhill has 
achieved renown on two primary counts. First, classes are optional, and decisions 
whether or not to attend rest entirely with the child. Second, community 
rulemaking and dispute resolution involve the school body as a whole. Underpinning 
these two foundational principles lies a commitment to democratic 
self-government and to children’s freedom (Neill 1948; see also Darling 
1992), commitments that have generated considerable interest and debate 
among educationalists since the school’s founding (e.g., see Hemmings 1972). 
Summerhill’s eminence as an innovative space does not come just 
from the way it functions as a school. It lies also in the example Summerhill 
poses as a successful, intergenerational, residential community, one that 
has endured for over eighty years. Other intentional communities might 
find much that is instructive in Summerhill’s approach to rulemaking and 
rulebreaking—its use of ombudsmen, annual law reviews, hearings, fines, and 
 
1. This article draws on data funded by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust. 
Primary material comes from semistructured interviews with nine teachers, nineteen children, 
and Zoe Readhead, the school’s headteacher. Interviews varied in formality, length, and style. 
Some were conducted with teachers between classes or when no one had shown for a scheduled 
lesson. Discussions with children ranged from intensive one-on-one conversations in a secluded 
space to group discussions that children joined and left as their interest waxed or waned, or 
other needs and preferences became pressing. In addition, this article draws on A. S. Neill’s 
own writing, the recorded experiences of Summerhill by other visitors, school documents, and 
is supplemented by recorded observations over a series of five visits (comprising ten days in 
total) during 2002 and 2005. 
2. See school Web site at http://www.summerhill.co.uk/pages/basics.html (accessed 
March 27, 2007). 
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the explicitly nonmoralistic approach it adopts toward infractions. They 
might also find considerable value in Summerhill’s approach to property. 
On the surface, Summerhill’s approach echoes the impetus toward 
private property and individual control, described above. One teacher I spoke 
with commented, “It’s very gratifying and nice to know this [classroom] is 
my space and I have a say over how it’s used and by whom. Some very public 
spaces get disrespected because they’re nobody’s.”3 Neill (1968a) makes 
a similar point, describing his difficulty getting students to treat tools carefully. 
I concluded that what was wrong was that the tools were used communally. 
 
“Now”, I said to myself, “if we introduce the possessive element 
. . . things will be different.” . . . I brought it up at a meeting, and the 
idea was well received. Next term, some of the older pupils brought 
their own kits of tools from home. They kept them in excellent condition 
and used them far more carefully than before. (133) 
 
Yet, the rhetoric of private ownership at Summerhill belies a more complex 
tapestry, one that resonates strikingly with other scholars’ discussion of informal 
and unofficial common property practices (e.g., Blomley 2004b, 2005). In 
exploring this tapestry, my aim is twofold. First, I want to use this study to 
refract a broader conception of property organized around relations of belonging 
rather than control, where rights are fragmented and institutional authority 
dispersed. Second, and following from this, I want to explore the work performed 
by property practices within a community. While much of the communal 
literature emphasizes property’s dysfunctionality, I want to address its 
practical and symbolic productivity and do so by focusing on property’s role 
in creating, managing, and sustaining what I will call a “variegated” social. 
 
As a botanical term, variegated describes distinct, adjoining differences, 
principally of color. My intention is to use the term “variegated social” to 
underscore how, at Summerhill, different but complementary practices and 
relations come together to form a richly textured and multifaceted social 
life. In other words, Summerhill is not organized around a rigid, fixed notion 
of how to live communally—that all practices and relations, for instance, 
should be public, visible, and accountable (see Kanter 1972). Nor does it 
go to the other extreme and assert the primacy of solitude, partiality, or individualism. 
Rather, Summerhill manifests a spectrum of relations, norms, and 
practices. This spectrum is one of complex interconnections as public and 
private interlock to form chains of spatialized and normative practices. In 
this article, I prise apart the links to focus on the character of the individual 
parts. 
 
Why Summerhill sustains a variegated social lies outside this article’s 
scope. What I am more interested in pursuing here is the contribution property 
 
3. Field notes, October 7, 2005. 
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relations make to it, that is to producing and maintaining, but also to challenging 
and complicating, a patterned kind of social life. I do so by focusing on three 
dimensions of school practice: personal, civic, and boundary. These provide 
a basis for exploring not just what property means but also the work property 
does.4 My analysis takes as its terrain two important sets of distinctions, 
although, as I explore, these distinctions are far less clear-cut than they might 
at first glance seem. The first concerns property as either a subject-object 
or part-whole relation, that is, as organized around a person’s mastery of a 
thing, or as characteristics of a larger entity that are authoritatively recognized 
and that produce external as well as internal effects. The second distinction 
deals with the question of how property works. Here, my analysis centers 
on the difference between constitutive and mediated effects, a framework I 
use to explore whether property’s achievements inevitably and necessarily 
unfold, or whether they depend upon, and are shaped by, other social action. 
 
THINKING ABOUT PROPERTY 
 
Property theorists have expended considerable energy arguing over 
conceptions of property: Is property an open-ended and unlimited form of 
ownership or a bundle of discrete (severable) legal relations? And if a bundle, 
what relation, if any, provides property’s core to which all others relate? Several 
writers have treated the right and ability to exclude as central (Eleftheriadis 
1996, 48–49; Gray 1991; Penner 1997). Others, particularly those coming 
from more sociolegal traditions, have described property first and foremost 
as a social practice of routine and iteration; understanding property then 
depends on exploring the multiple, everyday ways in which it is imagined, 
discussed, inhabited, and fought over (Blomley 1997, 1998, 2004b). 
 
My aim here is to craft a way of thinking about property that helps 
illuminate Summerhill life. I therefore draw on school members’ perceptions 
as well as my own observations. Together, they suggest a broad conception 
of property, one that encompasses unofficial as well as official law, informal 
(de facto) as well as formal (de jure) practices, and intangible as well as 
tangible things. More specifically, property practices at Summerhill involve 
five intersecting dimensions: (1) belonging, (2) codification, (3) definition, 
(4) recognition, and (5) power. These five dimensions can be found in 
property practices within other organized, communal environments; however, 
my focus is their application to Summerhill. 
 
4. I have chosen these terms rather than the more familiar private and public for two 
reasons: First, interviews and observations suggest public and private were not key discursive 
terms. Second, the gendered connotations of public and private, particularly in the way they 
frame relations between distinct gendered spheres (home/workplace, intimate personal space/ 
public domain), are only weakly apparent at the school. 
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The first, and most important, aspect of property practice is belonging. 
While belonging is conventionally seen as descriptive of the already 
propertied relationship—“my shoes belong to me”—or as metonymic substitute in the 
form of “belongings,” I want to consider belonging as the core element of 
property at both a definitional and normative level. While control is popularly 
figured as property’s crux, it does not help in differentiating between governmental 
and propertied practices once the distinction between self-interest 
and other or collective-interest or between private and public rights no longer 
anchors the property/government divide. Belonging, by contrast, as I discuss 
below, provides one way of delineating property from governance, since 
governance, importantly, can operate when no particular or distinctive 
relationship of belonging with that which is governed exists. 
 
In her discussion of autonomy and interdependency, Jennifer Nedelsky 
(1990) explores the case for interrogating and replacing masculine metaphors 
of separation with feminist ones based on connection. Although I do not 
pursue the gendered character of these metaphors, my analysis of belonging 
explores a similar distinction. This article considers two kinds of belonging, 
which work in different, though often overlapping and hybrid, ways. The 
first identifies a relationship whereby an object, space, or rights and freedoms 
over it, are held by the property-holder. This subject-object relationship 
provides the standard legal definition of ownership or property, centered on 
fungibility, mastery, and commodification. Severability is thus also emphasized 
in that the thing owned or possessed can be separated—legally, physically, 
and emotionally—from the one who possesses it (see also Penner 1997). In 
this sense, fungibility works in two ways: the thing is replaceable but so is 
the owner. I shall refer to this first orientation as that of subject-object to 
highlight the centrality of an instrumental, hierarchical relationship between 
the agent and a severable thing or space. 
 
Belonging’s second orientation is not usually understood as propertied 
in the legal sense. However, my broad reading of both property and law allows, 
indeed requires, it to count. It concerns belonging as a relationship of connection, 
of part to whole. By this I mean something broader than Margaret 
Radin’s (1993) property for personhood, which tends to focus on items already 
in the category of potential property—that is, things that can be bounded 
off from the self (41). My starting point, rather, is with social relations 
of belonging—child/family, collective identity/community, language/cultural 
groups (Maurer 2003). While both orientations treat belonging as implicating 
and involving wider social relations and networks (see also Singer 2000)— 
whether a child belongs to a family or a chair belongs to a householder implicitly 
(and often explicitly) is about relations to others—this second orientation 
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concerns a particularly constitutive relationship between part and whole. As 
such, it draws on a quite different understanding of property as the attributes, 




My second aspect of property practice is codification—how a thing 
comes to condense or represent a far more complex set of relationships. 
Despite the oft-made assertion that property is a relation between people 
rather than a thing (Davies 1999, 342), it is usually things that become read 
as property (although, in making this point, I take on board the counterassertion 
that the process of being read as property causes phenomena to  
appear as things (see Strathern 2004)). Property is a coding that does leave 
a mark. In this sense it has a material quality. Property is not just what someone 
imagines a thing to be but a form of coding that locates relations to a thing 
within wider regulatory and epistemic structures. How this works varies 
according to the kind of belonging in question. While a severable form of 
belonging may encode the thing as commodity—defined, made meaningful, 
and valued by its market relationship—a relational form of belonging may 
encode the thing “as an embodiment of one particular relationship” with 
something defined as its “whole ” (Strathern 2004, 214). In many cases, layers 
of coding overlap each other. So, for instance, at Summerhill, the school 
grounds function as a potentially severable, commodifiable thing (and, as 
such, as alienable) for the school’s owners as well as a core attribute of what 




Integral to the abstracted objectification of the thing, located within 
its diverse, materially significant systems of meaning, is a third aspect: definition. 
I use definition to mean both the process of bringing something into focus and 
the establishment of a thing’s contours and boundaries (see also Underkuffler 
2003, 21–23). Pursuit of definition encompasses attempts to fix legal boundaries 
around the thing (Heller 1998) as well as around relationships to it (Blomley 
2004a).5  Being encoded as property requires certainty and clarity, even as 
encoding things as property invariably illuminates the limits of both. But 
property also involves a less abstract knowing, inciting rights-holders to bring 
the interiority of the thing—its dimensions and characteristics—into sharper 
focus (see also Moran et al. 2001, 411). Property relations thus signify a 
 
5. That is, whether this kind of relationship or thing can be propertied (Blomley 2004c, 
45) as well as whether this particular version is. 
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process of familiarization (Cooper 1998). In conventional legal terms, such 
familiarization is articulated to mastery—an asymmetrical relationship of 
control that impresses and subordinates that which is owned to the other’s 
will (see also Davies 1994, 1999). This asymmetry frames subject-object relations 
of belonging. However, definition does not have to take this form. Stewardship 
is one model of a different, if still asymmetrical, approach in which mastery 
and understanding are oriented toward preservation rather than exploitation 




Fourth, property depends on authoritative practices—formal and informal, 
collective and individual, singular and routine—that bestow recognition and 
entitlement upon particular relations of belonging while ignoring, discounting, 
or rejecting others (Alexander 1998, 688; Radin 1986). Bestowal 
of recognition has both a formative and entrenching character. It includes 
practices that encode things, relations, and claims as propertied ab initio. At 
the same time, authoritative practices cement, reiterate, or mirror a prior 
recognition, or produce such recognition as is already in existence through 
citing prevailing norms. In the Summerhill context, state and community 
fora provide overlapping and sometimes competing sites of recognition. 
However, Summerhill also demonstrates how recognition of property relations 
does not depend on institutional authority, which may only come into play 




The final aspect of property practice concerns power and is the reason 
why I have underscored the importance of authoritative recognition. In other 
words, the coding property entails as either object or part depends on the 
capacity for coding to make a difference. Recognition that carries no weight, 
that is, in a sense, a “failed performative” (Butler 1997, 16), cannot effectively 
encode relations of belonging as property. The deliberate outcomes or effects 
of property relationships operate at two levels. First, they include particular 
acts in relation to the thing, by both self and others. In the case of belonging as 
a subject-object orientation, this tends to involve rights (positive entitlements) 
 
6. While stewarding or guardianship suggest a more co-constitutive form of belonging, 
the assumed physical and legal (if not affective) severability of the thing cared for (and often 
guided) configures stewardship as more hybrid, as when constitutive relations are superimposed 
to direct and circumscribe a particular variant of the commodity structure (such as through 
environmental safeguards on land owned). 
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and freedoms and powers (capacities) regarding the use, transformation, 
exclusion, and alienation of the thing or space. For belonging as a part-whole 
orientation, effects upon the part are more complicated. Where the attribute 
or entity belonging is human, as in the case of Summerhill students, a common 
exercise of power involves “property limitation rules” (Harris 1996a, 
1996b). Here, the part’s exercise of agency is limited and structured by 
relations of governance underpinned and rationalized through the part’s 
belonging to the whole. By contrast, when the attribute or part lacks human 
agency, power exercised upon it tends to involve a form of husbandry, 
rationalized in the name of stewardship. 
 
The second level of effects addresses the impact of property practices 
on relations and norms beyond the parameters of the subject-object or partwhole 
form. In the discussion that follows, I explore property practices’ power 
in promoting personal, civic, and boundary norms. This can be understood 
without too much difficulty in the context of a subject-object property 
relationship, even though the ability to use belongings effectively as tools 
to achieve particular results may fail (see generally Harris 1995; Waldron 
1988, 312). However, the dynamic, noninstrumental quality of the part-whole 
relationship is conceptually more complex. Here, the generation of effects 
depends less on the deliberate manipulation of the part than on the embedded, 
contextualized ongoing interrelationship of part and whole, as illustrated at 
Summerhill in the relationship between the school’s reputation and history, 
on the one hand, and the enduring corporate presence to which it belongs, 
on the other. 
 
In the article’s second half, I explore the contribution of school property 
practices to personal, civic, and boundary life. Before doing so, however, I 
want to take the conceptualization of property just elaborated and locate it 
at the regime level of the school. My focus is the organization of subject-object 
relations (part-whole relations of belonging provide a context, less 
tangible parallel and complicating feature as I explore below). In so doing, 
I highlight the plural character of recognition, the dispersal of property rights, 
and the constraints on property’s power. 
 
Summerhill’s Property Regime 
 
Legal centralism is like monotheism in that it posits one all-powerful 
god. Pluralism replaces one god with a pantheon, but there is nothing 
atheistic about it. (Manderson 1996, 1060) 
 
While Summerhill defers absolutely to certain state laws, such as those 
involving drugs and under-age sex (see Segefjord 1971, 64), its property practices 
are constituted and take shape through a legally pluralist regime of asymmetric 
institutional recognition (see generally Griffiths 1986; Kleinhans and 
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Macdonald 1997; Merry 1988; Tamanaha 1993). Institutions involved include 
official state practices, unofficial but still formal declaratory acts by the school 
meeting or headteacher, and the informal, iterative, intersubjective sayings, 
doings, and expectancies that express and sustain the school’s property ethos 
and culture. The relationship between different authorities in producing and 
sanctioning school norms can be seen in the following two examples. Both 
exemplify the local cultural significance given to declarations of possession 
and ownership. The first concerns the case of labor and the ability of actors 
to create new property. 
 
In many schools, children casually acquire property rights to the things 
they create, such as paintings, essays, or sculptures. At Summerhill, this Lockean 
(1988, 287–88) mode of property creation is taken further (see generally 
Blomley 2004b; Macpherson 1964; Waldron 1988, 171–77). By moving 
something from a state of nature and mixing it with their labor, children 
gain control, and in some cases even powers of disposal,7 over spaces and 
physical structures within the school grounds, like treehouses and burrows 
(see also Macpherson 1964). At the same time, these rights are justiciable. 
Claims to space can be “brought up”—a Summerhill term for the process 
where one person brings a case against another at a school meeting—if they 
appear excessive. One teacher described a case where a boy claimed possession 
of a part of the school grounds that he had cleared of nettles.8 He was brought 
up at a school meeting on the basis that the space he had recoded as “settled” 
was too large, its boundaries too expansive (see also Locke 1988, 288–91). 
However, after discussion, the school meeting recognized his rights of 
possession: the boy’s labor conjoined with his property assertion transformed 
and redefined the space—what had previously been “vacant” was now of 
value thanks to the labor he had vested in it. 
 
This labor case illustrates how school norms both preexist but are also 
brought into being and given effect through recognition by the school meeting 
(see also Underkuffler 2003, 19). In other cases, state law underpins school 
norms or is produced as foundational in the context of a dispute. Neill (1968a, 
25) nicely illustrates the authority of official property rights (as well as their 
contestation), telling of a time when the school government had resigned 
and a child came to him to say he had broken some school windows in 
protest of Neill declaring himself Dictator. 
 
“Gee,” he cried, “I don’t have to pay for them at all.” 
“But what about the private property rule?” I asked. “The windows are 
my private property.” 
 
7. Research visit, June 11, 2002: One teacher described a tree house that had been built 
for some kids who then bequeathed it to others when they left. He described this power of 
disposal as a recognized right held by those in possession of the built structure. 
8. See informal conversation with teacher, November 21, 2002. 
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“I know but there isn’t any private property rule now. There isn’t any 
government, and the government makes the rules.” 
 
Yet, as Neill narrates, the boy offered to pay. 
 
The complex interrelationship between different sources of authority 
contests a reading of legal pluralism as the presence of distinct, discrete institutional 
mandates (see Manderson 1996). At the same time, how authority 
is viewed depends on where one is standing. From the state’s perspective, 
property interests at Summerhill are simply forged out of the owner’s rights 
through a combination of leases and licenses. However, from inside, something 
else is going on. Not only are state-mandated property rights glazed 
over through the operation of school rights but, from the school’s perspective, 
these latter ones have independent authority. So long as Summerhill 
continues, its owners, for the most part, act as if they too are subject to its 
democratic control and rules, at least in relation to rights allocated away. 
 
Neill (1968a, 24) describes his recognition of the unofficial property rights 
of others: “When Billy, aged five, told me to get out of his birthday party 
because I hadn’t been invited, I went at once without hesitation—just as 
Billy gets out of my room when I don’t want his company.” 
 
This may sound like a standard residential lease: the freeholder cannot 
enter at will just because she or he has residual or prior title. However, at 
Summerhill, adults’ respect for children’s spaces does not derive from official 
state law; it comes from the authority the community bestows upon informal 
school norms, its formal rules, and democratic structures.9 This authority can 
also clash with state law, as took place in relation to defining access to the 
school lavatories. Summerhill, as Neill (1948, 84–85) describes, is committed 
to boys, girls, and adults sharing the same toilets on the grounds that the 
school is like a family.10 However, public officials have strongly disapproved 
of such open access rights implying such rights encode a risk of abuse rather 
than benign family life.11  
 
The second key characteristic of Summerhill’s property regime is its 
extensive dispersal of rights, permissions, and freedoms. While some belongings 
belong, other things and spaces are less exclusively possessed. Although 
a stickiness and tenacity to ownership claims is apparent, particularly in 
relation to individual possessions, which children acquire and hold  
 
9. The headteacher controls allocations of children’s bedrooms; however, once allocated, 
the head (like anyone else) can be brought up at a meeting for breaching rules relating to 
conditions of entry. 
10. See Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. Interestingly, the toilets 
by the front door had become gender-differentiated by my visit in 2005. When I inquired 
why, a teacher told me the girls had proposed it, fed up with the state of shared toilets. 
11. Report from Ofsted Inspection (OFSTED Report 1999, para. 12). OFSTED (Office 
for Standards in Education) is a nonministerial government department charged with carrying 
out inspections of schools. 
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unequally,12  property relations, for the most part, are not structured according 
to liberal, territorial norms of a protected sphere of indefinite and undefined 
activity in which the owner is king and few uses prohibited (Penner 1997, 
72; see also Chesterman 1994, 15). Rather, legal relations are fragmented 
(see also Alexander 1988; Singer and Beerman 1993), and delimited by substantial 
exclusions and prohibitions. In part, this follows from the hollowing 
out of property rights just described. The school’s owners reallocate access 
and management rights in varying, though usually small-sized, parcels to 
school members, both collectively and as individuals (although rights of 
alienation tend to be held back). As one teacher described in relation to a 
kid who damaged his bedroom with a machete knife: “It’s his to use but 
not to wreck.” However, to read property rights purely as a “scooping out” misses 
their complexity. First, the same rights may be held by different people in 
a context where a right to exclude granted by state law meets a right to 
exclude granted by the school meeting. Second, different rights, created and 
granted by distinct and different actors, such as the headteacher or school 
meeting, produce intricate chains of entitlements, powers, and freedoms. 
The third dimension of Summerhill’s property regime concerns both 
systemic and ad hoc constraints placed upon the exercise of power— 
in relation to particular things and spaces as well as through relations to things 
and spaces. The limited capacity of property practices to produce deliberate 
effects is not due solely to an institutional inability to code relations of belonging 
effectively whether by state or school. It also derives from several other 
factors that significantly explain the particular, distinctive character of 
Summerhill’s property regime. One systemic factor is the interplay of propertied 
and nonproperty practices—those competing as well as those forming the 
synchronic and diachronic context within which any given property practice 
occurs (see also Underkuffler 2003, 44). 
 
Systemic constraints also intersect deliberate acts of agency that work 
to curtail property’s scope. One such at Summerhill involves the exercise 
of institutional authority in refusing to stand behind particular interests or 
by undermining their property status. An example of this, discussed in more 
detail below, concerns children’s transmission of confidences; a second 
concerns the relationship between parents and children (which, whether as 
a subject-object or part-whole relation of belonging, Summerhill explicitly 
seeks to de-propertize). Deliberate acts of agency also work to prohibit 
particular property manipulations (Harris 1996a, 90; 1995, 427). Sometimes 
these involve the school’s exercise of “trumping” ownership: bedroom windows, 
 
12. Research notes, October 7, 2005: One instance observed during a field visit concerned 
an older boy skateboarding while a younger boy called out after him, “It’s mine!” A third boy 
went after the older one saying the skateboard belonged to the young child. The older boy 
replied that it had been lying around since the previous term and everyone used it, but he 
gave it up to the boy making the initial claim. 
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for instance, as Neill (1968a, 25) suggests, belong to the school’s proprietors, 
not the rooms’ incumbents. Most prohibitions or conditions, however, are 
anchored in collective membership and emerge as acts of governmental 
authority rather than the exercise of a foundational property-holder. In other 
words, they are not framed through discourses of “it’s mine,” but rather 
through discourses of “fairness,” “necessity,” and “right.” So, several age-based 
restrictions are placed on children’s ability to sell, loan, or give away their 
possessions, a strategy that protects but also limits use rights. Concern that 
children would be pressured to give away or transfer their things below value 
also led to the establishment of a “swindling committee” to mediate transactions 
involving younger children for property worth over a defined amount: £5.00 
(about $8.00 U.S.) in 2003.13  And when I revisited the school in October 
2005, severe restrictions were placed on borrowing the belongings of younger 
children.14 In this discussion, I have focused on belonging as a subject-object 
relationship in order to show how Summerhill differs from more conventional 
property regimes. In so doing, I have stressed three central aspects: the school’s 
commitment toward recognizing a pluralist framework of authority, its dispersal 
and fragmentation of property interests, and its structured, if largely 
delimited, organization of property’s power. But where does this take us? 
I want to suggest Summerhill offers a lens onto a different form of propertied 
practice. First, it draws us toward thinking about property as a set of 
networked relations in which the subject is embedded, rather than as simply 
exercising mastery or control over an object (Reich 1964, 771). Decentring 
(or reversing) the subject’s mastery and dominion comes in part from having 
multiple enacting and recognizing authorities; it also comes from the limits 
placed upon propertization, particularly in relation to alienation, as well as 
from the dispersal of propertied interests. Such dispersal not only significantly 
dilutes any single actor’s will but also renders his or her exercise of property 
interests contingent on the propertied exercise of others (Bell and Parchomovsky 
2005, 564; Heller 1998). Although in a combined or joined-up form, 
such rights may constitute a substantial manipulation or exploitation of the 
thing or space, disaggregated their power is limited in both weight and scope 
(see also Chesterman 1994, 29). 
 
Second, overlapping authorities, dispersed rights, and limited power mean 
property relations do not stand out sharply from other nonpropertied relations 
to things and spaces. This lack of clarity and definition is a centrally important 
feature of property relations at Summerhill. At the school, extensive talk 
 
13. School Laws, no. 73, January 2003. 
14. Summerhill also forbids children selling clothes to each other (Neill 1968a, 57; Segefjord 
1971, 84–85). This law was “passed on the ground that such practices were unfair to 
the parents who buy the clothes and unfair as well to the school, because when children go 
home minus certain wearing apparel, the parents blame the school for carelessness” (Neill 
1968a, 57–58). 
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about individual ownership and control of things and spaces abounds; Neill, 
in his writings, repeatedly underscores the importance of individual ownership 
(e.g., 1968a, 23, 132–33), and the school routinely gives individuals, such 
as teachers, extensive formal control over spaces and things, such as classrooms 
and equipment. Indeed, it was this striking (and for me unexpected) 
feature of Summerhill practice that precipitated this article. Yet, rhetoric of 
ownership and property respect intersects a social system within the school 
in which rights are disaggregated, institutional recognition dispersed, and 
where the productive capacity of spaces and things is structured and largely 
determined by agenda of governance—by belonging rather than belongings. 
To this extent, property interests blur into nonpropertied ones, that is, into 
relations of belonging that may be recognized but not formally protected, 
protected but scarcely empowered, or where rights and permissions over 
spaces and things are based on relations of membership rather than prior 
possession. 
 
In the second portion of the article, I turn to consider routine and 
one-off property practices, building upon my discussion of Summerhill’s 
distinctiveness as a property regime that is simultaneously fragmented, plural, 
and fuzzy. Property practices are not separate from the property regime; they 
are underpinned and constituted by it, as they, in turn, help to produce, secure, 
and enable it to evolve. Here, my discussion centers on the work that property 
practices do, focusing on how propertied acts in both constitutive and mediated 
ways facilitate, shape, and guide the production of a variegated social 
life within the school. I draw upon the five aspects of property identified 
earlier, but particularly the first—belonging—in both its subject-object and 
part-whole form. 
 
THE PRODUCTIVE LIFE OF PROPERTY 
 
Summerhill’s practical articulation of property often seems in tension 
with its talk (given the latter’s emphasis on individual ownership and 
possession); nevertheless, together, they do a lot of community work. They 
provide a communicative mechanism that children and newcomers easily 
understand and a recognized basis for organizational decisions. Neill (1968a, 
132–33) also, as I suggested earlier, saw private property as promoting commitment 
and care for personal and collective things. In this discussion, I 
want to consider property’s social function from a different perspective, focusing 
on its facilitation of a spectrum of doings, beings, and interactions, as 
framed by the umbrella terms personal, civic, and boundary. These terms, 
or the more common phrasing of public and private onto which they largely— 
if not entirely—map, have been extensively explored (e.g., Grear 2003; Sheller 
and Urry 2003; Squires 1994). I will therefore bracket what has become a 
large and well-rehearsed debate, with its varied and complex negotiation of 
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the different meanings, applications, and relationships the terms public and 
private can have. Instead, let me just say that my exploration of personal 
life focuses on the individual exercise of choice and preference; in relation 
to civic life, I focus on collective forms of identification, activity, and 
governance, and I utilize the metaphor of boundaries to explore crossings 
between the school’s inside and outside. 
 
For intentional residential communities, the management and entitlement 
to seclusion, intimacy, and autonomy, on the one hand, and visibility, 
impartiality, and accountability, on the other, have oft proven central and 
sometimes very difficult matters. While a few communities have prioritized 
autonomy and privacy, more common has been the championing of public 
norms (Kanter 1973). Yet, as with the decline in communally owned and 
managed property, the attempt to live publicly also created community strain. 
The kibbutz is one of several instances in which the balance of living reverted 
over time toward more private organizing principles (see generally Cooper 
2004). Spiro (1963, 210) writes, “The desire to drink tea with one’s own 
friends in the privacy of one’s own room has become the symbol of [the] 
seeming dissolution of the camaraderie and family spirit that characterized 
the kibbutz in the past.” 
 
Yet even where residential communities desire to sustain simultaneously 
both private and civic norms, doing so can prove challenging, particularly 
where people live, sleep, work, and play in the same contained space. How 
can “the intimate inner world of the individual” (Sheller and Urry 2003, 112) 
be protected and enhanced when those surrounding her know everything 
about her daily life? How can differential relationships be sustained when 
disliked others are always present and when spaces and things are controlled 
by the community as a whole and allocated “impartially”? 
 
In discussing Summerhill’s management of these challenges, I want to 
begin by addressing the kind of sociality the school seeks to present. In many 
respects, despite its regular turnover of members, Summerhill resembles a 
large, untidy familial domain. As with other communities (Kanter 1972), 
this analogy is repeatedly drawn on in interviews and policy statements, as 
the example of the shared toilets, described above, attests. Ex-teacher Matthew 
Appeleton (2000, 90) writes, “The sense of being part of a huge family is 
a very strong one. For some kids it will be the place they have felt most at 
home in life. I have often heard older kids talking about their friends as 
being like brothers and sisters.” Zoe Readhead, Neill’s daughter and Summerhill’s 
headteacher, makes a similar point, “It runs a bit like being at home. 
. . . It’s like a home, it’s like a tribe, it’s like a family.”15 
 
Summerhill’s familial ethos informs the way it governs by combining 
civic and personal norms; it also permeates and structures its response to 
 
15. Zoe Readhead in conversation with Jerry Mintz, The Education Revolution [American 
taped radio show, no date]. 
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property. My reading of the school suggests it combines two models of sibling 
life: what we might roughly call the extended family and the modern home 
(see also Neill 1948, 31–33). In narratives of the former, older siblings manage 
and steward spaces and things on behalf of others and on behalf of the longterm 
collective interest. Seclusion depends on spatial opportunities rather 
than exclusive property rights, and use and possession of things is far from 
tightly drawn. By contrast, tales of modern families treat seclusion, partiality, 
and devolved, if unofficial, property rights as essential to the formation of 
the autonomous self (see also Kumar 1997). 
 
These two versions of family life meet at Summerhill; indeed, many 
property conflicts at the school concern the tensions arising between them. 
Cases brought up at school meetings deal with personal possessions or parts 
of school property routinely borrowed without permission or damaged. While 
the modern family is modeled on the requirement that permissions are asked 
for and given between children in recognition of their severable ownership, 
and while Summerhill discursively asserts the importance of respecting others’ 
possessions and spaces, it has not entirely overcome the difficulty of achieving 
“practical excludability” in a context where children often lay claim to the 
things around them (see also Gray 1991). Ex-teacher Appleton (2000, 40) writes, 
“Here I was in probably the freest school in the world, carrying around a bunch 
of keys that would be the envy of the average prison officer” (see also Neill 
1968a, 132). But, as cases brought up attest, even locks and keys fail.16 
 




“Summerhill is a place where children can be left alone.”17 
 
Seclusion or privacy, the right to feel unwatched or unmonitored, tends 
to equate in Western societies with privilege or regard—only those stigmatized 
or distrusted need to be kept under surveillance. Yet, this perspective 
receives its counterpoint in the acknowledged marginalizing effects of forced 
invisibility, as lesbian and gay activists, for instance, have argued. Such invisibility 
can be achieved through several governmental techniques, including 
the imposition of property limitation rules that structure and curtail who 
 
16. Research visit, June 6, 2002: In making this point, it is worth noting school cycles 
in attitudes to property. During my visit in 2005, in contrast to previous visits three years 
earlier, I was struck by how many rooms were left open despite housing valuable equipment. 
As one teacher remarked, artwork could now be left up on the school walls without risking 
vandalism. Thus, on this visit, the emergence of stronger norms of property respect, however 
fragile or temporary they might subsequently prove to be, seemed to be doing some of the 
work previously performed by keys and locks. 
17. Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. 
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can do what where. So, at Summerhill cigarette smoking, while permitted, 
must take place away from younger children to avoid tempting them to smoke. 
Toilet activities, likewise, are restricted to private cubicles (the school does 
not have urinals). At the same time, rights, freedoms, and powers, in relation to spaces, 
can be deployed to achieve voluntary rather than compulsory seclusion (Williams 
1990, 84). One example at Summerhill, for older children and adults, is their 
right to a nonshared bedroom—a place that others can be excluded from. 
For younger kids, obliged to share, seclusion depends on creating microspaces, 
for instance by curtaining one’s bed or by asking roommates to temporarily 
withdraw. But seclusion is not just a solitary activity. Groups of friends will 
find spaces in the grounds and buildings to get away from others. Other groups, 
defined by identity or position (rather than affective ties), also use freedoms 
and rights over space to be apart, usually from particular designated others. 
So, older girls appeared, from my observations, to linger around their dorm. 
Although the outdoor space was not officially acknowledged or protected 
as theirs, it was little used by others, and importantly, was set back from 
the domain visitors tended to cross. Using property rights to achieve a status-based 
seclusion is also often contested. So, a teacher’s proposal to make the 
staff room adult-only was rejected on the grounds children would feel 
excluded, although it was agreed teachers could lock the door when carrying 
out “private” work.18 
 
Property practices’ relationship to seclusion highlights the tension outlined 
earlier between my two readings of belonging: as subject-object and 
part-whole in form. According to the first reading, school members use their 
rights and freedoms over space to achieve privacy and solitude. However, 
the efficacy of rights cannot be guaranteed. While school members I spoke 
with in 2005 commented on the level of respect for each other’s privacy, earlier 
visits in 2002 witnessed several occasions in which children brought each 
other up at school meetings for disregarding their spatial rights. Rights-holders’ 
adjudicative success, on such occasions, worked to entrench the codification 
of the space as already theirs. At the same time, to the extent challenges 
proved frequent, rights-holders’ practical ability to use the space exclusively 
was limited.19 
 
Yet, even where breaches do not occur, control over individual spaces is 
not necessarily the best way of ensuring seclusion. Several teachers interviewed 
in 2005 suggested if they wanted time alone, they would go into town—a 
space of strangers promising more seclusion than the ostensible privacy of 
their bedroom, given the demands for attention and feelings of responsibility 
living at Summerhill engendered. 
 
18. Research visit, June 11, 2002: Interview with teacher. 
19. Legal decisions by the school meeting may prove insufficient to bring seclusion into 
being; on performative speech (see Butler 1997; Schwartzman 2002). 
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If seclusion cannot be achieved through property rights, might it be 
more productively read as something that belongs as a property (or attribute) 
of particular spaces rather than as a belonging? For instance, one teacher 
described how the physical landscape of the school allowed for solitude and 
a private dream-space. “You can walk in the woods and imagine being lost 
. . . the landscape allows being alone.”20 
 
Here, seclusion becomes a constitutive element of the landscape; this does not deny the 
crafted character of the space—the ways in which the grounds have been consciously produced to 
ensure seclusion. Nevertheless, an important aspect of this second reading 
is recognizing the extent to which the relationship is a dynamic one: seclusion 
is not just produced, but as a property of the grounds, it shapes their character 
and how they are experienced. Indeed, seclusion goes further, as a property 
of the grounds, to shape also the social, institutional, and symbolic entity 
that is Summerhill School. 
 
Addressing seclusion in this way decenters agency: people do not use 
property rights and freedoms, beyond bare access, to achieve particular outcomes, 
for these outcomes are there regardless. Seeing seclusion as a property 
of a space means that it exists, at least potentially, for all users. Yet, in the 
case of Summerhill’s grounds, this claim was disputed by one teacher who 
remarked that, for him, solitude was hard to come by in the school’s woods 
precisely because it offered a secluded space for groups of “wild” children 
playing there (a claim echoed by many Summerhillians, e.g., Neill 1968a, 29). 
Seclusion may therefore prove a failed or uneven property of particular spaces. 
While failure can occur for several reasons, one reason concerns the way 
the instrumental exercise of property rights can work to undermine more 
constitutive effects. In other words, while most Summerhillians have 
insufficient (practical) dominion to achieve seclusion through mastery of 
particular spaces, the school’s bestowal upon them of wide-ranging and 
relatively unconstrained access rights has the effect of constricting the school’s 
coexisting objective of achieving seclusion as a fundamental characteristic 




One standard dimension of property practices is their ability to create 
and signify partiality or affective distinctions. So, property becomes a mechanism 
for variously producing and performing relations of strangers, enemies, 
acquaintances, friends, institutionalized hierarchies, and intimates. This is 
a conventional attribute or function of property within capitalist societies 
and relates to property as a relationship of mastery and control, where rights 
 
20. Research visit, June 11, 2002: Interview. 
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over things and spaces are deployed for their particular effect upon relations 
with others. 
 
As a residential school community, members’ ability to license others’ 
entry into their bedrooms, and to share and alienate things, reveals not only 
distinctions between relationships but as well their ebb and flow. While interviews 
at Summerhill underscore the unconditional right of members to deny 
access to their personal spaces and things, a norm of inclusion appears to 
coexist. This is exemplified by the extent to which people allow others into 
their spaces. Moreover, when they do not, some reason is commonly provided. 
This tends to be weaker than the reasons given for ejecting people from 
the school’s civic spaces; nevertheless, it still represents a form of personal 
account. Thus, in the claims “You’re pissing me off,” “It’s too late,” “I’m 
tired,” “She was too noisy,” we see reasons less rooted in property status 
than in the conditions of belonging and community entitlement of both 
rights-holder and evictee. 
 
The tension between the right to exclude and the norm of inclusion 
highlights the tension between a subject-object and part-whole orientation 
to belonging. While the right depicts things and spaces as properties that 
can be utilized to achieve affective effects, the norm represents the space 
as property, in the sense of being constitutive of community life. These two 
features do not simply pull against each other but provide instructive insights 
into Summerhill life. First, their combination suggests that property rights 
are not substantially deployed at Summerhill to differentiate between affective 
relationships.21 This may be because the spectrum of affective relationships 
at the school is narrower than beyond, causing the differentiation work commonly 
performed by property to be less pronounced.22 Alternatively, it may 
be that mechanisms other than property are used to perform this role. From 
interviews with adults and children, choices about who to play or spend leisure 
time with seem to operate as more finely tuned devices for performing and 
displaying affective distinctions. 
 
Using property to signal and sustain differentiated relations is secondly 
bounded by the treatment or property limitation rules different kinds of things 
receive. Some things cannot be used with some kinds of people to denote 
attachment or trust, such as giving younger kids cigarettes or pornography. 
In other cases, the school fails to codify a thing as belonging in ways that 
will be institutionally protected (and therefore generate repercussions on 
breach). One instance of this concerns the school’s unwillingness to treat 
as property information circulating among children. While eavesdropping 
 
21. Research visit, October 6–7, 2005: Interviews. 
22. Research notes, October 6, 2005: One girl remarked that in a small community you 
needed to get on with people and that living closely you saw different sides of other school 
members so you didn’t usually dislike them. 
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might be brought up,23 the passing on of secrets between children—a further 
way of signaling relationship differentiations—appears to be treated differently.24  
Re-circulating other people’s confidences is not uncommon; indeed, 
one teenage girl remarked, “it’s very difficult to keep a secret because everyone 
knows everyone, so news travels fast.”25 However, when I asked adults and 
children during my 2005 research visit, nobody could recall a meeting dealing 
with this kind of breach. A couple of interviewees remarked that bringing 
someone up for disclosing a confidence was pointless, since it would then 
mean everyone knew about it. Others suggested an ombudsman might be 
asked to intervene. However, children also said that members should not— 
indeed, one teenager remarked, it was their responsibility not to—disclose 
information to those known to be untrustworthy. 
 
Codifying confidences as a form of protected belonging is not the only 
way of securing the selective and controlled communication of information. 
At Summerhill, in common with other residential communities, access to 
places where private exchanges can take place is perhaps more crucial. It 
is also possible that the refusal to propertize children’s confidential information 
can be seen as having affective consequences. I asked school members 
whether failure to provide relief led to fewer confidences being communicated, 
a suggestion that was denied. Indeed, while circumspection may be required 
in deciding whom to tell, the refusal to propertize confidential information 
also works, at least in theory, to enhance the ongoing capacity of circulating 




The third aspect of personal life I want to consider is selfhood. By selfhood, 
I mean a sense of one’s own individuality or distinctiveness—the growing 
realization of one’s preferences, desires, and wants, combined with the shaping, 
honing, management, and “advancement” of one’s self. Selfhood is thus 
the product of both imaginary and practical iterations. And one component 
of both is property. 
 
For conservative and liberal property theorists, the contribution of 
ownership or possessions to the production and expression of self is a major 
basis for valorizing property. This is particularly apparent in Margaret Radin’s 
 
23. Report of an Inquiry into Summerhill School—Leiston, Suffolk (2000), in which the school 
expressed criticism of government education inspectors for eavesdropping on two girls chatting 
in the school woods: “If a Summerhillian had eavesdropped on their conversation like that 
they would have brought them up at a meeting” (19–20). 
24. Confidential information held by adults about children or about each other appeared 
to be treated with more care; it also seemed unlikely an adult would bring up another adult 
for a breach of confidence at a school meeting. 
25. Research visit, June 11, 2002: Interview with older student. 
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work on property for personhood. Radin (1993) argues that it is through 
the ongoing relationship with particular, meaningful spaces and things— 
through the control and the self that is vested in them—that people become 
full persons (see also Radin 1996). Radin’s work has been critiqued for its 
culturally particular and, some have argued, overly narrow conception of the 
constitutive role played by property (see Penner 1997, 206; Schnably 1993). 
Other writers have stressed the harms caused by commodification and alienation 
to selfhood, arguing instead for the importance of collective and common 
rights, and interpersonal relationships to developing a sense of self and personal 
autonomy (see Nedelsky 1990). 
 
At Summerhill, community is important to this project of selfhood as 
are the things children bring with them, from momentos of their family and 
home to clothes, bicycles, and tools. Nevertheless, in the way adult school 
members, in particular, talk about being and becoming a person, liberal conceptions 
of the possessive individual as proprietor of his person and capacities 
play a particularly important part (Macpherson 1964; see also Davies 1994). 
According to Neill (1968a, 27), “The function of the child is to live his 
own life”;26 the “individual’s conception of his [sic] good life [should not] 
. . . be sacrificed in some overall social plan” (Grunebaum 1987, 144). 
 
Similarly, current headteacher, Zoe Readhead, declared, “When you’re not 
in class, you’re your own person.”27 Children are not only to be protected from 
the imposition of a corporate school agenda, their right to a private life secures 
them from their parents’ impositions too. Summerhill does not send reports 
home: “children’s lives at school are considered their own business.”28 
But what or who is this “self ” possessed and to what extent is such a 
possessed self embodied? Judith Squires (1994, 399) writes, “Control over one’s 
own body is crucial to the maintenance of a sense of self and hence the 
ability to interact openly with others.” Nevertheless, whether this control 
should be read through a property framework has been subjected to considerable 
debate as opposing scholars draw property’s conceptual boundaries in ways 
designed to include or exclude the body and personhood entirely or in part 
(Davies and Naffine 2001; Harris 1996b; Mason and Laurie 2001; Munzer 
1990; Penner 1997; Radin 1995; Strathern 2004; Williams 1990). While I 
am sympathetic to the motivations of those who refuse to codify the body 
as property, I see this as a normative stance—one, unfortunately, that does 
not reflect practice in many contexts (see also Radin 1996). 
 
At Summerhill, the propertied character of children’s relationship to 
their self and their bodies is evident from a reading of the school’s rules and 
policies.29 It can also be seen from the claims recognized and protected by the 
 
26. Italics added. 
27. Zoe Readhead in conversation with Jerry Mintz, The Education Revolution [American 
taped radio show, no date]. 
28. Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. 
29. E.g., see Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. 
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norms and institutional authority of the school, which give children far greater 
control over where their bodies can go than exists in other schools. Indeed, to 
the extent such control includes not attending classes, the freedoms bestowed 
by Summerhill have at times outstripped the perception of many state officials 
about what practical embodied autonomy for children should entail.30 
 
At Summerhill, bodies and personhood are explicitly encoded in both 
legal and other ways as belonging to the self. So, alongside children’s formal 
(though unofficial) rights to determine what their bodies will do and where 
they will go, including to partake of “risky pastimes . . . the sort of games 
which other children participate in outside school hours,”31 they also have 
control over others’ ability to make physical contact with them. The entitlement 
of children to deny access to their bodies, whether to educators or to 
other children, is no longer socially unusual. What stands out at Summerhill 
is the democratic enforcement of these rights, including bringing others up 
at school meetings for nonconsensual physical touching.32 What also stands 
out at Summerhill is the right to allow touch; indeed, the school operates 
from the premise that some nonsexual physical contact will be granted and 
initiated between adults and children, at appropriate times. According to a 
school policy statement, “Hugging, sitting on laps and other physical displays 
of affection are an accepted and much valued part of community life.”33 This 
does not mean Summerhillians must permit physical contact. Interviewees 
suggested adults and children could always say no, and there is no expectation 
people should be into hugs and cuddles. One teacher, arguing physical contact 
was for the child and should be led by the child, claimed teachers were wrong 
to initiate nonsexual touching to meet their own needs, for instance the 
need felt particularly by new teachers for acceptance and inclusion.34 
Children and adults’ rights over what their bodies can do and where 
they can go are thus subject to continually redefined property limitation rules. 
Classes may not be compulsory, but rights over other aspects of one’s own 
body’s movements are restricted. These rights do not represent the operation 
of some foundational property rights-holder, but are imposed on members 
for pastoral reasons of safety, security, and community interest. So, rules 
restrict and regulate adults and children leaving the grounds, staying in bed, 
or watching television. Other rules regulate the kinds of touch, particularly 
sexual touch, which can be made available to others. These latter contact 
limits, influenced by the wider regulatory and cultural context, are particularly 
 
30. See OFSTED Report (1999, paras. 10–12). Para 11: “The school has drifted into 
confusing educational freedom with the negative right not to be taught. As a result, many 
pupils have been allowed to mistake the pursuit of idleness for the exercise of personal liberty.” 
31. Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. 
32. Research visit, June 11, 2002: One teacher described a case where a boy was brought 
up for physically touching a girl nonconsensually. 
33. Summerhill General Policy Statement, June 11, 2002. 
34. Research visit, October 6, 2005: Interview. 
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marked between adults and children.35 So, the staff handbook states that 
staff visited by pupils at night must ensure their door is open or that someone 
else is in the room. The commentary to the policy declares this may feel 
intrusive of relationships with children, but advises that behaving otherwise 
would put the school and individual at risk if an incident occurred.36 
If Summerhill’s discursive and practical propertizing of the body contributes 
to selfhood, how does it achieve these effects? On the one hand, 
Summerhill recognizes the body as partially commodified to the extent the 
school sees bodily autonomy and control as something children need to possess 
in order to enhance their personhood (but as something other schools 
conventionally withdraw—and can withdraw). In other words, achieving 
personhood is not unconditional but needs to be nurtured by giving children 
greater control over their bodies. At the same time, Summerhill’s ethos, rules, 
and genealogy construct the body through a relational matrix of belonging; 
it is not a belonging but something constitutively ours. As such, personhood 
becomes both the effect of a dynamic relationship between self and body 
and the terrain upon which it is played out. 
 
However, one limitation of this approach is that it can fail to see the 
extent to which the co-constitutive relationship between body and self is 
socially (and interpersonally) mediated. This can be seen in relation to gender. 
With its firm opposition to proactive gender equality policies, Summerhill 
has operated from the premise that in an environment where children’s bodies 
are free from overt gender conditioning, children can form less narrowly 
gendered identities.37 My observations of the school cohere with Readhead’s 
and others’ claims that gendered performances are less polarized than might 
otherwise be expected. Nevertheless, watching children play, interact with 
each other, use tools, and manage their self-presentation, circuits of gender 
are present that trouble any simple model in which the activities of selfpossessed 
bodies bring unmediated forms of personhood into being (see also 
Butler 1997; Naffine 1998; Nedelsky 1990). I develop an account of property’s 
more mediated effects at Summerhill in the discussion that follows. 
 
Producing Civic Life 
 
A Collective Identity 
 
In conducting research at Summerhill, one particularly striking quality was 
the extent of members’ collective identity. In many ways this is unsurprising. 
 
35. For instance, in 1999 education inspectors reported that “Some of the physical contact 
between staff and pupils could be misconstrued and as such is ill-advised” (OFSTED Report 
1999, para. 31). 
36. Summerhill School Handbook, Child Protection Policy, June 13, 2000. 
37. See, for instance, interview with Zoe Readhead, November 22, 2002. 
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Members of residential communities tend to have a strong, collective sense 
of self, and in the case of a historically enduring, periodically threatened 
school with few peers, a strong sense of and commitment to its identity and 
values is to be expected. However, two aspects were less anticipated. First, 
school members were reluctant to agree that a common identity existed, 
despite considerable evidence of its apparent presence to me as an outsider. 
Rather, those I spoke with highlighted the range of meanings the school held 
for members.38 Second, I did not anticipate the complicated relationship 
between collective identity and layered discourses of belonging. In exploring 
this latter point, I want to explore two ways in which property contributes 
to a collective identity. The first, which I shall tackle briefly, concerns the 
work of property breaches and, in particular, their subsequent adjudication. 
Ownership provides both the means and terrain through which mischievous 
behavior can take place, and offending, as thieving or vandalism 
by small temporary groupings, works to generate alternative, unauthorized 
identifications (see Neill 1968a, 243; Popenoe 1970). In turn, the school’s 
response to property breaches, and the reassertion of rights that happens in the 
process, (re)produces a hegemonic, collective self. This is the “we” who recognize 
the grievance and deal with the malefactor. While in conventional schools the 
responsibility placed on staff to deal with infractions works to reproduce hierarchies 
of authority and control, at Summerhill responsibility falls to the school collectively 
to find solutions. This shared responsibility, alongside the collective 
frustration felt toward those who repeatedly or seriously offend, constitutively 
reproduces the school’s identity as a democratic, self-governing community. 
The identity generated through adjudicating property infractions also 
extends beyond this bare democratic shell. As several students explained, 
adjudication works through a series of premises: that accusers rarely lie; that 
people tend to acknowledge culpability; and that the aim is not to shame 
(or even to rehabilitate), but to mark the annoyance or harm caused by 
imposing warnings or “fines” (Neill 1937, 48–49)—whether as monetary 
penalties or compulsory acts (Appleton 2000, 104). In this way, property 
“trials” work constitutively (in the absence of any counterchallenge) to 
denote the presence of a community of free, reasonable, and fair individuals. 
This is a community that is utilitarian, nonpunitive, and inclusive, where 
members, importantly, recognize everyone at some point will break the law 
and where, through acknowledgment of wrong-doing and acceptance of a 
fine, members are immediately reincorporated back into the polity (see also 
Popenoe 1970, 33–36; Segefjord 1971).39 
 
A second way in which collective identity is produced concerns the shared 
property held by school members in Summerhill’s name and reputation. 
While government inspectors and others refer to Zoe Readhead, the owner 
 
38. Research visit, October 6–7, 2005: Interviews. 
39. Members can also ask a subsequent meeting for fines to be revisited and reduced. 
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and headteacher, as the guardian of Summerhill’s founding principles,40 the 
school has sought—at least to some degree—to collectivize this stewardship.41 
Collective ownership of Summerhill’s identity was something Neill himself 
publicly defended; he wrote (1948, 35), “Summerhill is not mine: it belongs 
to a collective movement that embraces many” (cf. Segefjord 1971, 12). 
This kind of stewardship suggests a hybrid form of property. It constructs 
Summerhill’s reputation, its self-reflexive narrative, as a thing of value, 
encoded through relations of knowledge, mastery, and belonging, in ways 
that have institutionally authorized effects. The strength of, and responsibility 
attributed to, school members’ stewardship was evident in various ways during 
my research visits. On one occasion, a boy came up to me while I was outside 
chatting to a new, younger school member and said, “This may sound kind 
of rude, but can I ask who you are?”42 On another occasion, I asked an older 
girl if she would explain the school’s ombudsman process to me. She said 
that she would while she made herself a cup of tea, and I followed her back 
to her dorm. There she asked another teenage girl—who happened to be 
chairing school meetings that week—whether it was okay to talk to me. The 
chair asked if I would “trash the school,” and on hearing my denial, said 
there was, in any event, nothing much currently going on to worry about.43 
A further example, which highlights the importance of institutional 
recognition to establishing collective property in Summerhill’s reputation, 
including in its future, took place during the school’s appeal against the 
Education Secretary’s “notice of complaint” that threatened to lead to 
Summerhill’s removal from the private schools register. This chain of events 
followed concerns raised by the 1999 education inspection. In the course 
of the court hearing, the government proposed a compromise settlement.44 
The school asked for time to consider it. They took over a courtroom and 
held a school meeting to determine collectively whether the settlement 
should be accepted. Matthew Appleton (2000, 266) writes, “There really is 
something extraordinary about this case in which High Court proceedings 
are stopped and government officials are forced to wait, while a meeting of 
children decide whether or not to accept their proposals.” While the decision 
to allow the meeting to play this role was, arguably, in the hands of the 
 
40. E.g., OFSTED Report (1999, para. 58). 
41. Research visit, October 7, 2005, interview with teacher. While children I spoke with 
in 2005 characterized Summerhill as belonging to the whole community, I was struck during 
my visit that year by the way teachers, on being asked, immediately identified the school as 
belonging to Zoe Readhead. This seemed more marked than during my visits in 2002 and to 
have been provoked by an article in the Daily Telegraph (June 18, 2005), referred to by several 
teachers, that erroneously called the school a “workers’ co-operative.” However, claims of Readhead’s 
ownership were also defined largely in stewardship terms. “Ultimately, Zoe stands up 
and says it’s my school—you can be with me or against me, but I believe in it; it’s my dad’s idea.” 
42. Research visit, October 6, 2005. 
43. Research visit, diary notes, June 11, 2002. 
44. See The Guardian (2000). 
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school’s owners, it cannot be simply dismissed as such. Aside from the 
unusualness of adopting this course of action within the wider educational 
sector, it reflects a relationship of trust in which the school community, guardianlike, 
hold property in, and the property of, Summerhill’s future. 
 
The intersections between Summerhill as a business concern and as a 
democratic self-governing community are evident in the different forms of 
belonging brought here into play. Summerhill’s name and reputation belongs 
to the community in a constitutive sense, comprising who and what they are; 
it belongs to the owners in a proprietary form as something of commercial 
value. However, this dichotomy is too simple, as the metaphor of stewardship 
reveals. On the one hand, the community as guardians of the school’s reputation 
treat it as an object worthy of nurturing in order, at least in part, to protect 
Summerhill’s long-term financial viability. On the other, the school’s owners 
see Summerhill’s name and reputation as nonfungible—a form of property 
that is constitutive of their own familial identity as descendents and kin to Neill. 
Relationships of stewardship, then, highlight the complex character of 
belonging. Stewardship also reveals the importance of institutional recognition 
to constitutive property relations. While more mediated effects can be generated 
even when propertied interests fail to be subsequently recognized or are then 
withdrawn, constitutive outcomes, such as collective identity, often emerge 
through the very process of institutionally bestowing recognition here upon 
school members as guardians. In this context, the authoritative assertion that 
the school belongs to the community can be seen as bringing a collective 
identity into effect—an echo of much property scholarship that implicitly 
or explicitly assumes the performative power of legal judgment. At the same 
time, while the generation of a self-reflexive sense of “who we are” may invariably 
follow authoritative assertions of collective stewardship, as occurred at 
the High Court, the shape and texture of such identities do not directly 
follow. I indicated above that one site for the production of a thicker identity 
was the way cases were dealt with at school meetings, a far more routinized 
occurrence than the High Court hearing, and one—as I return to below— 
central to Summerhill’s rhetoric about itself. Yet even here, the filling in of 
what a collective identity actually consists of proved subject to competing 
practices. In other words, the content of the school’s collective identity is 
far more mediated than the simple process of its production. It is also subject 
to alternate property practices conveying different norms and values, as well 
as to the intervening effects of other aspects of Summerhill life, including 
the changing composition and character of its members. 
 
The Social Commons 
 
Elsewhere, I have considered the social commons as a space that constitutes, 
recognizes, and permits multiple, overlapping uses (Cooper 2006). 
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At Summerhill, the social commons as a physical domain is produced out 
of shared, collectively used indoor and outdoor spaces. While some “public” 
spaces have prosaic primary functions, such as the computer or dining rooms, 
others have a more expressive, communal orientation. Zoe Readhead, when 
interviewed, stressed the importance of civic spaces, such as the Café—a 
cozy room away from the main building used for serving snacks, playing games, 
and rehearsing plays. “The Café is a warm, nice space . . . it’s become a sociable 
space where there are things to do. . . . You need to have spaces for people 
who don’t want to go to classes and be somewhere else.”45 
 
While such spaces are coded as belonging to the school as a whole, 
the material work of producing a social commons depends on two particular 
property practices. For reasons that will become clearer, these practices 
combine aspects of a subject-object and part-whole property form. On the 
one hand, they concern a shared sense of reciprocal belonging between members 
and school; on the other, access, control, and use rights are treated as 
severable (with members in a largely fungible, or mutually interchangeable, 
position in relation to them). First, and at the most basic level, school 
members exercise shared access rights to use particular spaces. While 
access is often restricted or circumscribed through timetabling activities— 
the dining room, for instance, is also used for individual piano lessons—the 
premise is that civic spaces offer and thrive upon shared use. Indeed, even 
when piano classes take place in the dining room, other people can quietly 
read or sit in the room as well.46 For civic spaces, unlike personal ones, 
require rule-based exclusions to be justified through the application of 
impartial or, at least, fair principles, even if these work, as they often do at 
Summerhill, to exclude particular activities by particular children (Appleton 
2000, 108). 
 
The second way property practices contribute to a social commons is 
through the rights and powers bestowed upon assigned individuals or groups 
of school members to manage or govern particular things or spaces for the 
benefit of the wider community. Harris (1996b, 61) refers to this as a form 
of quasi-ownership because rights-holders are not authorized to use their rights 
in a self-seeking manner (see also Harris 1995, 434). I want to treat this 
also as a form of quasi-ownership but for a different reason—namely that 
the rights generated are not linked to a special relationship of belonging. 
The space belongs to committee members, just as it belongs to other 
Summerhillians. But this does not mean committee members’ relationship 
to the space is not coded differently; it is, for the period of time that their 
charge lasts, but it is a special relationship of responsibility rather than of 
belonging. For Summerhill, sustaining its identity as a democratic, self-governing 
 
45. Interview, research visit, November 22, 2002. 
46. Research visit, October 6–7, 2005. 
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community depends upon groups of children playing a governing role.47 While 
some spaces and things are under the purview of particular adults—teachers, 
for instance, have dominion over children’s presence and conduct in their 
classrooms—civic spaces and things tend to be governed by individuals or 
groups of children. So, committees, such as the Gram Committee, exist to 
manage and use sensitive equipment, because “not everyone can play the 
expensive and delicate equipment, which would otherwise quickly get wrecked” 
(Appleton 2000, 70). 
 
The role played by school committees is somewhat akin to that of 
government officials. Although committee members may well benefit from 
the activities organized, their rights and powers of control are given to promote 
community events, such as socials, parties, and plays. So, for instance, 
the End of Term (EOT) committee is entitled to enter and transform the 
space used for the EOT party, while temporarily excluding everyone else (see 
also Popenoe 1970, 46–56). The power flowing from these rights of management, 
like the rules governing use of civic spaces, is circumscribed by the 
requirement to act fairly and, to some extent, impartially. Committee members 
should not let different levels of affectivity or intimacy influence their 
decisions, although shared civic knowledge of fellow members—whether they 
are, for instance, careful, diligent, or trustworthy—can produce institutionally 
sanctioned differential treatment. 
 
To the extent property practices contribute to the production of a social 
commons, how mediated is this process? It is often assumed that shared access 
constitutively produces a social commons, in the sense that a space used by 
all depends on everyone having access to it. But this seems both tautological 
and thin; it also avoids the nagging concern that open access is often not 
enough to ensure widespread use. A thicker reading of the commons suggests 
a place not only of shared access entitlements but also one in which diverse 
uses by diverse members take place. This thicker reading suggests open access 
is insufficient in itself to create a social commons, which is dependent upon 
(and vulnerable to) far more mediated and informal processes to ensure spaces 
do not become de facto private places dominated by a single grouping. The 
character of the property regime can have an impact here. While Summerhill’s 
fragmented rights and complex chains of property interests are likely 
to facilitate a social commons, since many school members have rights or 
freedoms that abut or traverse particular spaces, authoritative decisionmaking 
structures, such as the school meeting, also play an important role. 
Not only do they help to sustain a social commons by reflecting and responding 
to changing interests and practices so that use of spaces remains relevant 
 
47. During periods where groups of responsible children have not existed in sufficient 
numbers, Summerhill has encountered difficulties sustaining its ethos and principles of operation 
(see Appleton 2000, 73; Segefjord 1973, 127–28). 
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and productive, but they also help to deal with the conflicts of use a thick 
social commons tends to generate.48 
 
Being Visible and Managed 
 
The final aspect of civic life I wish to discuss relates to the school’s 
visible, open spaces and activities that cross and sit alongside its hidden, 
secluded ones. I suggested at the start that seclusion does not necessarily 
indicate privilege; likewise, visibility does not necessarily imply surveillance 
and oppression. Here, I want to discuss two kinds of visibility produced by 
property practices largely organized around a subject-object form of belonging; 
the first concerns the visibility of voluntary spatial capture, the second 
addresses the observation, mediation, and role modeling of one group by 
another. 
 
During research visits in 2002 and 2005, I was struck by the continuously 
visible presence of a cluster of younger boys at the front of the school as a 
result of their informal monopolization of the forecourt. Combining collective 
use rights to the space, with their individual rights to manipulate owned 
bicycles and skateboards, their activities structured the social economy of 
this domain (though see Neill 1968a, 29). Indeed, the boys’ de facto, if unintentional, 
territoriality was strengthened by the school’s decision to place 
two ramps directly outside its front door. Without this, cyclists’ and skateboarders’ 
dominance would have been constantly up for grabs in the light 
of competing uses. 
 
In this instance, the boys’ use of things coded, recognized, and protected 
as unequivocally theirs, allowed them to dominate a particular space and, 
as a result, to produce their voluntary visibility. When I asked why these 
younger boys wished to be seen, one teacher suggested that they felt more 
secure being near adults.49 While a kind of protective custodianship may 
have been the boys’ unconscious intention in consciously deploying their 
possessions to master the space, their territorialization of the school’s entrance 
also articulated a more relational, co-constitutive form of belonging. Echoing 
tendencies in Neill’s (1968a) writings, we can see the boys’ visibility and 
activity as working to construct, at least for many of those visiting, a certain 
 
48. See School Laws, updated by Laws Committee and Meeting, July 2005. Several 
addressed questions of prioritization when wishes of members conflicted, for instance, over 
television or computer use. This was also apparent during my last visit in 2005. I arrived as 
Summerhill was in the course of a series of school meetings to resolve how to manage the 
multiple uses of the computer room—particularly the competing demands to use the computers 
as noisy, crowded game stations, and simultaneously as quiet, personal e-mail systems. This 
dispute also raised questions about how to deal with the fact children were in an unequal 
situation, as some had their own computers and so could play on them when they liked. 
49. Research visit, October 6, 2005: Interview with teacher. 
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sociocultural association of Summerhill with preadolescent masculinity. In 
other words, the boys belonged to a school whose identity was dominated 
by their presence. 
 
The deployment of things and space to achieve protection interfaces 
with the second practice of visibility I want briefly to discuss: visibility as 
a governmental technique. Visibility can work as such in a number of ways. 
Some methods, such as CCTV cameras, medical operations, and architectural 
panopticons construct the visible subject as passive and worked upon; others, 
such as examination and auditing, depend upon mobilizing the subject to 
contribute to producing and shaping their own (interior) visibility. 
While Summerhill’s governmental deployment of visibility largely relies 
upon the active, broadly willing subject, it draws on both direct and indirect 
forms of governing, underpinned by differential access rights. The former is 
apparent in the use of health and safety committees, ombudsmen, and 
“beddies” officers, collectively charged with maintaining community norms 
through checking, scrutinizing, and mediating place-based conduct. More 
interesting, perhaps, are the ways visibility is also generated through indirect 
forms of governing at a distance (Rose 1999; see also Cooper 1998). Echoing 
June Jacobs’s (1961) work on informal surveillance, Summerhill deploys 
property rights to bring older children into other children’s spaces. Yet, the 
circulation of older children through different areas, so they can act as a 
moderating force, requires more than simply formal rights of access. It is, 
for instance, not enough for older teenagers to feel common spaces belong 
to them (as part of the collectivity), if other spaces belong to them more 
particularly. Zoe Readhead also referred to the dilemma of making older 
children’s spaces too nice: “Does it mean younger kids are getting less input 
from older kids who might spend longer in their own area”?50 
 
More generally, and this lies at the heart of Summerhill’s ethos and 
contiguous approach to normative diversity, using property rights and 
practices to create visible subjects is mediated by subjects’ willingness to be 
visible (for instance, as I described in relation to cycling and skate-boarding 
younger boys). This does not mean only, or even primarily, creating an 
environment within which members choose to comply—a Foucauldian conception 
of governing through the agency of subjects. What it means, in the 
context of Summerhill, is giving members options, for the terms of students’ 
belonging is that constant scrutiny is not required. So, against the logic of 
untrustworthy subjects necessitating visible, governable spaces, Summerhill 
offers members access to spaces where secluded disorder can take place, as 
well as to spaces of managed publicity. Property freedoms, in particular, are 
used to make both possible. While they are structured and limited by the 
challenge of sustaining a residential, intergenerational community, property 
freedoms nevertheless provide crucial elements in children’s ability to access 
 
50. November 22, 2002: Interview with Zoe Readhead. 
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a diverse repertoire of normative options. At the same time, formal political 
rights and informal (sometimes seized) property powers are used to challenge 
and thwart these regulated options. This takes place “lawfully” when democratic 
decisions are taken, as they periodically are, to (temporarily) abolish 
all school rules, less “lawfully” when children, performing and replenishing 
local narratives of what belonging to Summerhill means, utilize rights over, 
or simple access to, things to breach temporal, space-based rules, such as 




Strangers as Visitors 
 
Summerhill is not a hermetically sealed space (Cooper 2004; generally 
Kanter 1972). It offers an environment that outsiders frequently enter. While 
a few come without any form of license, causing the school to invest in 
security measures to protect its spaces, things, and people,51 most enter with 
permission. Inspectors, other officials, tradespeople, and prospective parents 
regularly arrive. However, the group I want to focus on are those who come 
purely out of a social, political, or educational interest in the school. 
The presence of curious or committed outsiders is an issue many intentional 
communities confront (see Sargisson 2000; Skinner 1976). And communities 
have used different means of managing this interest. At one extreme 
are those rare communities who deny an insider/outsider distinction. Kanter 
(1972) describes the stance of such communities: they “wish to be open to 
all comers . . . where anyone can automatically ‘belong’ . . . some of these 
communities do not even make a member/non-member distinction; whoever 
is there at the time belongs”(402). This approach, however, has become 
relatively uncommon in more recent years as prefigurative and Utopian communities 
insist on demarcating visitors as such. Nevertheless, many remain 
keen to model their spaces, practices, and structures to outsiders. Some do 
so by incorporating visitors into their work schedules—thereby procuring a 
collective resource while simultaneously enabling people to experience 
community life. A less committed mechanism involves scheduled open days. 
Educationalists, academics, and other progressives from all over the world 
visit Summerhill, keen to witness its educational innovation firsthand. 
“One-time” visitors are formally welcomed on designated open days and 
looked after by Visitors’ Committee members. However, in ways that echo 
“limited common property regimes,” described by Rose (1998b, 139) as a 
commons within and a property regime without, a host of property rules 
 
51. Security measures were upgraded after problems identified during Ofsted Inspection 
(OFSTED Report 1999, para. 53). 
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work to mark, maintain, and communicate community boundaries (see also 
Blomley 2004a). I want to highlight this aspect of Summerhill’s property 
practice despite the reluctance of many interviewees to acknowledge the 
community-forging role property boundaries play. 
 
Observations during my visits suggest that the treatment of visitors 
through Summerhill’s collective property rules and members’ practices—their 
spatial pathways and use of things—contribute to reproducing Summerhill 
as a defined and bounded community (see also Cooper 2004). Visitors’ usefreedoms 
are particularly curtailed (indicative, perhaps, of previous problems 
arising from visitors’ overwhelming desire to be part of the school for the duration 
of their stay). At the time of my research visits in 2002, a large notice 
at the entrance informed visitors they could not have meals at the school, 
swing on the Big Beech, or use the swimming pool. Similarly, school laws listed 
in January 2003 prohibited visitors from remaining after 5:00 p.m., going upstairs 
in the main building, or entering people’s rooms without permission. These 
rules and prohibitions have several material objectives: to protect scarce 
resources, facilitate planning, enhance security, and ensure that things belonging 
to the school are available for members to use.52 At the same time, the rules 
work symbolically. This is exemplified by the ban on outsiders entering the 
school meeting—the democratic and emblematic heart of the school—until 
a vote has been taken. Through temporary banishment, a boundary between 
belonging and outsider is asserted: the visitor leaves the meeting room to 
stand outside in the front hallway, waiting for readmittance to be granted. 
Discussion of symbolic effects tends to produce a kind of constitutive 
analysis, so that the limits of rights are seen as inevitably producing, at least 
in this context, boundaries between inside and out (see also Sarat and Kearns 
1993). In this sense, a kind of illocutionary power is evident: authoritative 
property assertions produce, in the moment of their assertion, their intended 
consequences. Yet, while such assertions may have these kinds of symbolic 
effects, they break down at another level, since they cannot ensure the practical 
excludability they depend upon (see also Gray 1991). Once visitors are allowed 
into the school, spatial and temporal prohibitions can only partially cordon 
off sights and sounds. As a consequence, a reversal of belonging takes place; 
visitors shift from being the excluded to becoming the subjects of the property 
relationship, with Summerhillians as the objects. As one older student 
described, “We’re fucking zoo animals . . . some visitors were good . . . like 
kids from an alternative college and they know what it was like . . . but sometimes 
we have groups of people with cameras” (see also Popenoe 1970, 43).53 Other 
children echoed these comments when I returned in 2005. 
 
52. There is also, no doubt, a legal and insurance dimension to banning visitors from 
engaging in potentially dangerous activities. 
53. Research visit, June 11, 2002: Interview with student, italics added to reflect spoken 
emphasis. 
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This reversal, anchored in the permeability of boundaries (as well as 
in their production), reveals how subject-object and part-whole forms of 
belonging can overlap as well as blend. On the one hand, echoing Neill, 
the school can be seen as belonging to a progressive educational community 
of which it forms the central attribute or property. This is a community that 
does not exercise power through the school, but seeks to play a supportive 
guardianship role, coming to Summerhill’s defense as and when needed. 
Unsurprisingly, in its weak form, this is a form of belonging recognized and 
authorized by the school. Yet, the presence of actual outsiders within the 
school’s gates threatens to yield a different version of belonging, as permissions 
granted to visitors to look, listen, and ask questions turn the school into an 
object of scrutiny and, for some, of marketable value. This form of objectified 
belonging is not authorized by the school. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
visitor practices are without effect, even if the effects on Summerhill itself 
are relatively mediated. Alongside the negative impact of visitors’ constant 
flow on many members (particularly children), filmmakers and other reporters 
invited to present Summerhill to outsiders—to master the school’s meanings 
and practices and to recode them as a narrative object—can substantially, 
if temporarily, shape wider perceptions and public discourse, often in ways 
that significantly collide with school interests.54 
 
Leaving the School 
 
While asymmetries of access and use between school members and 
outsiders can identify who belongs in the course of determining what belongs 
and is available to them, equally central to the marking of boundaries are 
the property relations that come into play when Summerhill members leave 
the school grounds. I want to focus here on the work performed by the 
property Summerhill holds in its members; however, boundaries are also 
reinforced and given substance by the conventional property transactions 
engaged in beyond the school grounds. In relation to the latter, conversations 
with Summerhillians revealed a range of exchanges—from shopping, eating, 
and attending the cinema to using public transport and taxis. For the most 
part, these external transactions are relatively formal, individualized, and 
self-interested, highlighting, as one might expect, the normative boundary 
members cross on leaving the school. 
 
Describing children as belonging to Summerhill in some kind of propertied 
form, even if only during term-time, is, by contrast, more contentious. When 
interviewed, members balked at the idea of seeing themselves as belonging 
 
54. See for instance the controversy following the screening of the provocative Channel 
4 documentary Summerhill at 70 broadcast in March 1992 and the account of it by teacher 
Matthew Appleton (1993). 
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to the school, except at the most ideational level. However, in practice, 
several instances were evident. I will briefly illustrate three: members’ presence 
downtown as representatives (attributes or properties of the school that 
work metonymically to stand in for the school as a whole); the imposition 
of “property-limitation rules” (Harris 1996a, 90) limiting self-government or 
property in the self; and the construction of members as possessed parts of 
the school. 
 
Harassment of Summerhillians in the local town of Leiston illustrates 
how with relational forms of belonging the part can condense or stand in 
for the whole. Echoing a long siege mentality history (Croall 1983, 187–88), 
during my visits in 2002 students talked about the hostility they received 
in town because they were marked as Summerhillians and therefore as objects 
of jealousy. Zoe Readhead said, “We’re very separated off from the environment 
. . . people downtown roughed up the kids . . . they want to get down 
and back, spending their POC [pocket-money], before other kids get out [of 
school].”55 My second example concerns the property-limitation rules requiring 
children to conform to particular behavioral standards when in town. 
Matthew Appleton (2000, 165) describes the work of distinction-drawing 
in the case of a new boy brought up for swearing downtown. “It was explained 
again that although he could swear in Summerhill, when he went out he 
had to remember that many people took offense to swearing.”56 
 
The third example exemplifies the way boundaries come into play as both 
the means and effect of internal community work. It concerns responsibilities 
that come from being a member: by belonging relationally to a community, 
expectations emerge. However, it can also be read, more provocatively, 
through a subject-object framework in which the school places demands upon 
those it possesses. Yet, to the extent that the school in this example is the 
community, this becomes a collective reiteration of the possessive self. In 
other words, the community as a collective subject possesses itself as a severable, 
though not clearly fungible 57 object. One illustration of this process is the 
prohibition on residential students leaving the school for more than a limited 
number of weekends a term. Moreover, when going away for the weekend, 
students must obtain not only their parents’ permission, but—as an expression 
 
55. Research visit, November 22, 2002: Interview. 
56. See also School Laws, January 2003. This rule is not uncommon; many British schools 
are concerned with the image pupils present to the wider community. The difference is that 
in most schools “downtown” behavior represents a held, if unachieved, aspiration for conduct 
within the school itself. At Summerhill, by contrast, the “down-town” rule is a pragmatic 
one, based on the assumption that local people are insufficiently at ease or progressive enough 
to cope with internally shared school customs. 
57. The school’s possession of children as members inevitably means a degree of interchangeability, 
since it does not depend on particular individuals being members. However, 
several people, when interviewed, stressed that what Summerhill was like—its ethos, interests, 
and activities—depended on who its members were at any given time, and varied as different 
children and adults came and went. 
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of their belonging and commitment to the wider community—that of the 
school meeting. 
 
In these three examples, children’s mode of belonging to the school— 
as both members of a community and resources of a family business58— 
provides the medium through which the boundaries between inside and out 
are drawn and mobilized. While it is tempting to read this process as constitutive, 
in the sense that the construction of a boundary inevitably follows 
the fact that children “belong,” the data implies more mediated processes— 
especially in how inside and out are understood and in the agency exercised 
around the boundary’s materialization. One student illustrated this by describing 
how she would rather shop in town than in the “shops” established at 
school,59 because the prices in town were lower. In other words, she saw no 
reason to contribute to Summerhill’s youthful shopkeepers’ profits. Her comments 
remind us that normative conduct is not rigidly bounded and polarized. 
While we can posit two spheres of contrasting practice—the largely informal 
transactions, sharing and permissions evidenced in the school against the 
commodified, self-interested stranger relations within the spaces beyond— 
there are numerous exceptions. But the girl’s remarks also underscore the 
potential disjuncture between the community boundary effects of property 




My study of community property relations at Summerhill is, at its core, 
a response to three pervasive claims. First, it offers a counterillustration to 
the logic of intensified privatization depicted within some of the intentional 
community literature in which collective ownership becomes read as largely 
unsustainable over any length of time within democratic residential communities. 
Using Summerhill as my case study, this article demonstrates how 
community property practices that integrate individual and collective rights 
can prove relatively stable and enduring.60 Indeed, the article shows how 
the prevailing and reified dichotomy between public and private ownership 
can be misleading, particularly when property interests are disaggregated and 
different “sticks” are held or exercised by different actors (see also Rose 1998a, 
631). Nicholas Blomley (2004b, 2005), in his work on public gardening, has 
 
58. See also Neill (1937, 51) where he refers to a putative loss of income from students 
swearing in front of prospective parents. 
59. During my visit in 2005, three clusters of children had set up shops in their respective 
bedrooms (these were advertised all over the school), selling marked-up produce, such as crisps 
and sweets bought in town. 
60. Although some details of Summerhill’s practices have changed over time, the textual 
observations of visitors and school members from decades before my own research reveal many 
similarities, as do Neill’s own writings. 
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similarly explored how collective and individual rights come together in a 
chain of permissions, freedoms, entitlements, and powers. My aim here has 
been to tie this argument to the work property performs in ways that recognize 
the complex relationship between individual and collective property interests, 
on the one hand, and personal and civic norms, on the other. 
 
In so doing, I also seek, secondly, to complicate conventional legal 
property analysis’s exclusive focus on state enforceable claims (Macpherson 
1978, 3) by opening up the black box of unofficial property interests. State 
law is not unimportant nor is there a level playing field; in many contexts, 
state law will prove the dominant normative structure determining practices 
and outcomes. However, in contexts where other institutional authorities 
have significant effects, where property interests are fragmented, and the 
power ensuing from such interests is limited, fluid, and contested, a broader 
and more open approach to what counts as propertied things and relations, 
which can look beyond the kinds of property forms recognized by state law, 
is important. An analysis that only sees Readhead’s property interests not 
only misses, but also misrecognizes, what is taking place. While as the business 
owner, she has the residual power to pull out the bottom card that would 
cause it all to collapse, so long as she refrains from doing so, her property 
interests, from the school’s perspective, are a combination of residual rights 
retained (for instance, over room allocations) and individual community membership. 
She may seek to exert an influence through arguments based on 
superior “knowing” of the school, but like everyone else, when decisions are 
made at the school meeting, she has only one vote.61 
 
Third, and from a different angle, this article undercuts a branch of 
social theory that reads community as invoking sameness and homogeneity. 
It may seem empirically unremarkable that communities, such as Summerhill, 
embrace a range of diversities. However, theoretical work often treats community 
as synonymous with unity. I have sought to trouble this premise by 
focusing on variation at the level of norms, practices, and relations as they 
take shape in the terms of personal, civic, and boundary life. My aim has 
not been to set these terms against each other or to assume they exhibit a 
fundamental contradiction; while conflicts are often framed as a pitting of 
individual against community needs, research at Summerhill reveals their 
far more entwined character. I have not focused on this latter dimension 
here because my priority has been to map the extent and character of the 
school’s social repertoire. Spatial proximity, demographic density, and Summerhill’s 
in loco parentis status undoubtedly contain the personal, civic, and 
boundary norms displayed; yet a spectrum of variegated social norms and 
practices continue to be consciously produced, exemplified in Summerhill’s 
 
61. On some occasions, Readhead has overridden decisions made by others drawing, explicitly 
or implicitly, upon her official owner-status, but her sporadic need to do so highlights the fact 
that other people at the school routinely exercise formal, if unofficial, property rights. 
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deliberate spatial (and temporal) placing of wildness and disorder up against 
the spaces of disciplined visibility. 
 
In exploring how this diversity is generated and sustained, I have focused 
on the work performed by property. In doing so, I have not suggested that 
property is determinative, nor that its contribution is isolated and apart from 
other social practices. On the contrary, I have highlighted its complex embedding 
and entwining with other social norms and structures. In the process, I have 
sought to unfold and understand the apparent disjuncture between Neill’s 
and Summerhill’s repeated discursive emphasis on individual sovereign property 
rights (the modern home approach) and the limited, interdependent, and 
often indistinct manifestation of property interests (the extended family form) 
in practice. We can think about this tension in two, quite different ways. 
First, as doing particular work: property utterances facilitate a readily accepted 
rights-based, spatially oriented mode of governing, while the fuzzy materialization 
of property practices allows the school to exercise a plastic and 
extensive form of self-regulation, in which official state property rights can 
be accepted, bracketed, or remade as circumstances require. Second, we can 
see the tension between utterances and other practices as accentuating the 
mediated, contextualized character of property’s effects. Even property utterances 
cannot be seen as fully illocutionary when the claim “It’s hers” is not enough 
to practically render it hers.62 Consequently, and importantly, the chains of 
mediated effects need to be followed to see how property’s productivity is 
challenged, negotiated, disrupted, augmented, and adjusted. 
 
Tensions in how property interests are organized (as sovereign or fragmented) 
and in how property works (as mediated or constitutive) overlap 
a third distinction I have explored: between subject-object and part-whole 
conceptions of belonging. There are no simple alignments between these 
three organizing axes, as my analysis in this article demonstrates. At first 
glance, it might seem as if subjects’ fragmented rights in objects are more 
likely to generate mediated effects than other configurations. However, even 
with part-whole property relationships, such as between Summerhill and its 
secluded grounds, what seems like (mutually) constitutive processes of 
re-creation are open to being disrupted. Likewise, while cultural and symbolic 
meanings, such as an organization’s identity or boundary between inside and 
out, are often “read off ” propertied practices as if constituted by them, to 
the extent such meanings are materially produced, they depend not only upon 
the wider contexts within which they are embedded but on the presence 
(and absence) of competing acts and processes. 
 
Studying an alternative, residential community calls for new conceptualizations, 
in this instance of property, to help illuminate and make sense 
 
62. At the same time, utterances of belonging can operate in more illocutionary or constitutive 
ways. The practical refusal to recognize and defer to a single regulatory system allows 
alternative and unofficial property claims to exercise a performative power, for instance, that 
the school’s reputation and future belongs to the community. 
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of the data generated. Starting with two polarized conceptions of belonging 
as mastery, on the one hand, and membership, on the other, I have explored 
how at Summerhill they overlap, combine, and reform, and how as a result 
they provide the context, limits, and conditions of each other’s existence. 
I have also argued that property is more than belonging (however understood) 
and needs to be analyzed in relation to its other dimensions of codification, 
definition, recognition, and power. In this way, thinking about property relations 
in an alternative community allows us to look at conventional property 
concerns from a different angle and to ask new and different questions. Studying 
Summerhill sheds light upon the character, interconnections, and effects of 
different kinds of belonging; it enables us to explore how belongings and 
the properties of belonging generate effects, to consider what counts as the 
property act whose effects we are following, how individual and collective 
property interests cohere, and how the embeddedness of property—its lack 
of practical distinctness—impacts upon the work property does. 
 
Yet, as important as these conceptual questions are, studying Summerhill 
allows us to consider property from a different, normative angle. On the one 
hand, Summerhill may seem a trivial case with its apparent (if only partial) 
bracketing of exploitation, accumulation, and alienation. At the same time, 
Summerhill’s emphasis on use-value63 is productive in refocusing attention, 
at least within organized spaces, on who gets to enjoy—to access, use, choose, 
control, and take pleasure in—spaces and things and on the role that unofficial 
as well as official, informal as well as formal, and intangible as well as 
tangible property can play in managing and structuring community relationships. 
Paralleling the claims of other writers who have argued for the importance 
of looking beyond formal legal rights to the property interests of those without 
legal status (see Blomley 1997; Brigham and Gordon 1996), this approach 
has fundamental implications for rethinking and revisiting property practices, 
and the work such property practices perform, in currently underresearched 
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